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* fix(reconstruction): dedupe residual unknown ids with uniqueSorted Current main calls uniqueBy, which is not defined, so typecheck fails. Residual unknown ids are strings, and the adjacent lists already use uniqueSorted. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(config): make the bridge request ceiling configurable REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES replaces the hard-coded 16 MiB Hopper and Cutter request payload ceiling. The default stays 16777216 bytes. Values outside 7464 to 268435456 bytes are configuration_invalid. Part of #6176. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(cutter): keep cleanup ownership when a sent command's reply is oversized An authenticated command may already have changed the Cutter document when its reply exceeds the frame ceiling. Return the existing unknown execution, with the ceiling diagnostic in the message, so receipt cleanup still waits. A frame that overflows before the command is sent remains a resource constraint. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * style: format the bridge request ceiling sources oxfmt --check failed on the five files that set and test REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES. Formatting only; an oversized Cutter reply still stays an unknown execution. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(cutter): exclude the LF from the response frame budget REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES counts payload bytes. The Cutter response reader and authenticated encoder were reserving one byte for the terminating LF, so an exact-limit response was rejected. A reply that exceeds the ceiling after the command was sent still stays an unknown execution. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(bridge): measure escaped JSON before allocating the request A command of U+0001 characters can expand sixfold. JSON.stringify of that expansion can throw past Node's string ceiling before the payload check. Count the escaped size within REA_BRIDGE_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES first and refuse it as a resource constraint. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): derive the bridge request maximum from JSON expansion A 256 MiB ceiling still lets a shorter U+0001 command expand past Node's 536870888-character string limit. The maximum is now floor((536870888 - 296) / 7) = 76695798, the longest such command whose authenticated frame fits in one string. Requests are still measured before JSON.stringify. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(bridge): size the Cutter frame deadline and send the measured Hopper payload The authenticated Cutter command is encoded after the challenge, so a one-second read rejected an in-budget frame. That read now allows one second per mebibyte of the ceiling and never waits longer than 25 seconds. Hello stays at one second. Hopper writes the payload it already measured instead of serializing the same request again. Co-authored-by: morluto <morluto@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(config): bound the bridge request maximum by the serialized string The ceiling already measures escaped JS